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1. Introduction 
1.1 Current Debates on the Notion of “Emergence”
During  the last  twenty-five  years,  the  notion  of  “emergence”  has  gained  renewed
attention  in  different  fields,  from  evolutionary  biology  to  cognitive  sciences,  from
social  sciences  to  philosophy  of  mind.1 This  interest  is  connected  to  the  possible
application of the notion of emergence in the study of complex systems and to the
possibility of developing a “non-reductive physicalism” (Crane 2001: 207). Emergence
generally  describes  a  new  property  or  entity  appearing  when  a  system  reaches  a
certain threshold of complexity. Although the emergent element must be connected to
the  system  from  which  it  emerges,  it  must  also  be  novel (Bennett-Hunter  2015).
Furthermore, “emergence” is related to a middle road between radical dualism and
reductionism,  i.e.  to  a  theoretical  position  according  to  which  the  emergent
phenomenon (e.g., biological life or consciousness) is “grounded in and yet emergent
from the underlying material structure with which it is associated” (O’Connor 1994: 91).
In the contemporary debate, there is neither consensus about a shared definition of the
term “emergence,” nor a homogeneous use of the notion across the research fields
where it applies. Current theories of emergence thus disagree as to how “emergent”
phenomena  ought  to  be  interpreted  (see  Brioschi  2013,  part  I).  An  ontological view
argues for the real status of the emergent novelties, considered to be real components
of  the world and irreducible  to  the lower level from which they originated (Bunge
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2003). An epistemological view claims that “emergence” is “in the eyes of the beholder,”
i.e. that it is an object of our patterns of knowledge (Hempel & Oppenheim 1948; Baas &
Emmeche  1997).  Further  important  problems  lie  in  the  way  we  are  to  understand
emergence, whether in a weak or strong sense. According to Chalmers (2006), we refer
to  a  weak  emergent  phenomenon  when  “truths  concerning  that  phenomenon  are
unexpected given the principles governing the low-level domain,” but deducible from
them, while we interpret the emergence in a strong sense when “truths concerning that
phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain”
(ibid.: 244). 
Jaegwon Kim (1999: 20-4) has singled out some core topics in the current emergentist
debates:  a)  complex  higher-level  entities  and  properties  appear  from  lower-level
elements  and  constituent  parts,  some  of  them  being  “emergent,”  others  mere
“resultants”;  b)  emergent  entities  and  properties  are  “unpredictable,”  i.e.  all
information concerning their basic conditions cannot predict them in principle; c) the
emergent properties are unexplainable and irreducible, which is to say that they are
“neither explainable nor reducible in terms of their basal conditions”; d) the emerging
entities  or  properties  should  exert  some  causal  efficacy,  both  at  their  level  and
downward, on lower levels.
These topics involve some inconsistencies that still await to be solved. However, it is
undisputable that in contemporary debates the notion of emergence represents a lively
idea  for  “many  thinkers,  with  diverse  and  disparate  backgrounds  and  agendas  –
philosophers,  practicing  scientists  from  a  variety  of  scientific  fields,  and  science
writers.”  What  makes  emergence  so  attractive  is,  in  Kim’s  words  (2006:  547),  an
“intriguing  philosophical  question.”  Investigating  the  historical  origins  and  the
philosophical background of this notion will help to shed light on its meaning and on
the reasons for such interest.
 
1.2 James and John Stuart Mill: the Dawn of the Emergentist 
Tradition
Emergentism originally developed in the UK in the nineteenth century. John Stuart Mill
(1806-1873) is considered the noble father of this tradition, as he systematized an early
version of the notion (without using the word), starting from some theoretical insights
of his father, James Mill (1773-1836). 
In  Analysis  of  the  Phenomena  of  Human  Mind  (1829),  James  Mill  aimed  to  provide  a
psychogenetic  foundation  for  utilitarian  ethics,  by  reducing all  the  phenomena  of
human consciousness to an association of representations. Within this associationist
framework, Mill  claimed that “ideas which have been so often conjoined” seem “to
coalesce […] and out of many to form one idea.” This complex idea “appears to be no
less simple, than any one of those of which it is compounded” (Mill 1829, I: 68-9). Many
of our most general ideas, such as those of “extension,” “motion,” or “time,” have been
commonly regarded as simple ideas. On the contrary, they have different origins, being
the complex result of a number of simpler elements (ibid.: 70-1). In other words, Mill
describes the entities resulting from the aggregation of simpler parts not as the mere
sum of those parts, but as novel entities,  whose properties appear different from the
characteristics of each part taken singularly. 
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In the preface to the second edition of Analysis, John Stuart Mill claims that the main
task  of  that  work  is  to  “reach  the  simplest  elements  which  by  their  combination
generate the manifold complexity of our mental states and to assign the laws of those
elements”: a process akin to “the labour of the chemist to reduce the compound bodies
on which he operates […] to their constituent elements.” Therefore, Mill continues, just
“as in chemistry, it often happens that the qualities of the separate ingredients of a
compound body are not recognizable by us in the apparently different qualities of the
compound itself,” in the “chemistry of the mind, the compound sentiment that results
from  the  association  of  former  feelings”  has  “very  little  resemblance  to  these
constituents of it” (Mill [1829] 1878: viii-x). 
In  Book  III  of  System  of  Logic (1843),  J. S. Mill  provides  a  generalization  of  this
“chemical” causality and distinguishes it from “mechanical” causation – also called the
“Principle of  Composition of  Causes.” According to such principle,  which applies to
physics and mechanics, the effects produced by every single cause when acting alone
combine in a mechanical and deducible way that “is exemplified in all cases in which
the joint effect of several causes is identical with the sum of their separate effects”
(Mill 1843: 426). Chemical causality, which characterizes chemistry and other scientific
fields  such  as  biology,  consists  in  the  combination  of  two  different  substances  to
produce “a third substance with properties entirely different from those of either of
the two substances separately, or of both of them taken together.” These heteropathic
(as  opposed to homopathic )  effects  and laws concern phenomena in which the joint
effect of causes is heterogeneous with respect to the sum of the separate effects. 
Unlike mechanics, chemistry is not a deductive but an experimental science, since “most
of the uniformities to which the causes conformed when separate,  cease altogether
when they are conjoined” and we are not “able to foresee what result will follow from
any new combination, until we have tried it by specific experiment” (ibid.: 427). This is
even more true for biology, as living phenomena – which are made up of parts similar
to those composing inorganic nature – “bear no analogy to any of the effects which
would be produced by the action of  the component substances considered as  mere
physical agents.” Even if we were to possess perfect knowledge about the ingredients of
living bodies, “it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those
elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself” (ibid.). According to
Mill, like chemical and biological laws, which “will never be deducible from the mere
laws  of  the  ingredients,”  mental,  social  and  political  phenomena  follow  the  same
complex heteropathic patterns (ibid.: 430-2). 
As Carlo Sini (1972: 80-1) has highlighted, both J. S. Mill and his father warn us to not
confuse the origin of  a  feeling or  representation,  with its  emerging value.  Although
water  appears  to  be  an original  element in  nature,  it  is  the chemical  result  of  the
composition of gaseous molecules of hydrogen and oxygen, each presenting completely
different properties compared to the resulting liquid compound. Similarly, a feeling
may emerge as a novel trait, as in the case of pure altruistic generosity, yet derive from
the associations of original representations that have nothing to do with altruism and
generosity.  Once  the  new  property  has  emerged,  however,  it  presents  itself  as  an
entirely  independent  value,  even though it  has  been discovered to  be  the complex
result of the combination of simpler parts.
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1.3 British Emergentism and the Pragmatist Tradition
The System of Logic’s section “Of the Composition of Causes” has been defined “as the
locus classicus on the notion of emergence” (McLaughlin 1992: 58-9; Nagel 1961: 372).
Beyond Mill’s analyses, the evolutionist tradition from Darwin and Spencer to Wallace
and Haeckel contributed to defining a problematic framework within which mature
British emergentist positions were expounded, particularly through the work of Conwy
Lloyd Morgan (1852-1936) (cf. Blitz 1992: 46). The main problem for Darwin and the
evolutionist tradition was to trace the continuity in dynamic developments from the
inorganic world to the organic, from the lower living forms to those on a higher level,
and  to  find  a  proper  place  for  the  emergence  of  the  psychic  dimension.  Both  the
framework composed by the  evolutionary tradition and the theoretical  distinctions
drawn by Mill, and subsequently developed by Alexander Bain (1870) and George Henry
Lewes  (1875),  lay  the  roots  of  so-called  classical  British  emergentism  in  the  early
twentieth century (Stephan 1992: 25). The term “emergent” appeared for the first time,
in its technical sense, in Lewes (1875: 412-3), who posed the problem of the continuity
of nature, but refuted the traditional idea that the qualities of the whole should be
present  in  its  parts  and  that  subsequent  events  in  an  evolutionary  process  should
reproduce  the  properties  of  antecedent  events.  Lloyd  Morgan  adopted  the  same
approach in Emergent  Evolution (1923:  5):  “Evolution […] is  the name we give to the
comprehensive plan of sequence in all natural events. However, the orderly sequence,
historically viewed, appears to present, from time to time, something genuinely new.
Under  what I  call  emergent  evolution  stress  is  laid  on  this  incoming  of  the  new.”
According to Lloyd Morgan, although there is continuity in the evolution of natural
phenomena, it is impossible to predict features that emerge in the context of complex
natural systems from their bases in antecedent events. Any emergence is an ontological
novelty, not just an epistemic sign of the limits of human knowledge (Blitz 1992: 99).
Further  emergentist  texts  appeared  in  1920’s  Great  Britain  in  addition  to  Lloyd
Morgan’s work, such as Space, Time, and Deity (1920) by Samuel Alexander (1859-1938)
and  The  Mind  and  Its  Place  in  Nature (1925)  by  Charlie  Dunbar  Broad  (1887-1971).
Alexander  presented  his  idea  of  emergent  quality  within  a  broad  metaphysical-
theological framework, where he tried to put together the emergence of irreducible
qualities with their derivability from rigorous physical-chemical laws. Broad’s work,
where  “the  main  doctrines  of  British  emergentism  receive  their  most  mature
formulations” (McLaughlin 1992: 68, 79-89), challenges both the idea of the reducibility
of  all  sciences  to  physics  and  the  belief  that  physics  is  the  fundamental  form  of
scientificity. Broad distinguished two different kinds of scientific laws, i.e. intra-ordinal 
laws, which “connect the properties of aggregates of the same order,” and trans-ordinal
laws,  which  characterize  the  emergence  of  higher-level properties  and relations,
insofar  as  these  cannot  be  deduced before  their  occurrence in  nature  (Broad 1925:
77-8). 
Although British emergentists did not develop any unitary doctrine, they paved the
way  for  a  general  emergentist  conception  based  on  common  assumptions  (see
McLaughlin 1992: 49-51), which constituted “an alternative to mechanism and vitalism”
(Stephan 1992: 25). It is not my intention to reconstruct the different historical and
conceptual phases of the emergentist debates in detail.2 It suffices to say here that the
direction  outlined  by  British  emergentism  has  been  advocated  in  current  debates,
where  –  to  quote  Kim  (2006:  548)  –  “any  account  of  emergence  […]  should  show
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significant continuity with the concept that the British emergentists of the early 20th
century, such as Alexander, Morgan, and Broad, had in mind.” 
This  briefly  sketched  history  of  the  emergentist  tradition  shows  interesting
connections with so-called classical Pragmatism. Ferdinand C. S. Schiller, John Dewey
and  George  Herbert  Mead,  engaged  with  emergentism,  participated  in  the  debates
about  it  and,  in  some  cases,  adopted  emergentist  terminology.3 The  notion  of
emergence is particularly crucial in Mead’s Philosophy of the Present (1932), where it is
connected with Mead’s philosophy of time and with the social character of the human
mind,  self  and  language.  As  Dewey  states  in  his  Prefatory  Remarks,  Mead  “took  the
doctrine of emergence [much more fundamentally] than have most of those who have
played with  the  idea”  (Mead 1932  [2002:  33]).  In  the  Introduction to  the  same text,
Arthur E.  Murphy writes  that  “the dominant  strain  in  these  lectures”  derives  from
“that  philosophy  of  nature  which  will  no  doubt  be  regarded  as  the  characteristic
contribution of the 1920’s in Anglo-American philosophy,” of which “Alexander’s Space,
Time and Deity was the pioneer work” (ibid.: 14). The debates on emergentism were so
spread among Anglo-American scholars in those years that Murphy regards the notion
of “emergence” as a “catchword” of that period (ibid.: 11). This fact is what may have
fueled the interest of the classical pragmatists, who actively participated in the debates
on the matter and engaged with British emergentism. Conversely, emergentist thinkers
such  as  Lloyd  Morgan,  Alexander  and  Broad  never  considered  Pragmatism  an
interesting philosophy to be examined in relation to their own ideas or used to develop
their  own  thought,  except  for  the  work  of  William  James,  who  was  especially
appreciated as a psychologist.4
It is noteworthy that in the literature regarding the relationship between Pragmatism
and  emergentism,  almost  nothing  is  said  about  Chauncey  Wright  (1830-1875),  a
philosopher close to Mill’s and Bain’s thought and a crucial figure for the origins of
Pragmatism. In particular, he developed a very modern “emergentist” thought, which
struck  the  attention  of  at  least  one  of  the  leading  British  emergentists:  Samuel
Alexander once told Harold J. Laski that he had “discovered Chauncey Wright through
an old bookstall” in London, where he had come across the Philosophical Discussions (see
Wright  1877  [PD]),  and  “was  very  impressed.”5 Laski  adds  in  the  same  letter  that
Alexander “said that C. W. gave him the impression of the most powerful philosophic
mind America had so far produced” (De Wolfe Howe 1953, II: 1327-8). The letter is from
1931  and,  unfortunately,  there  is  no  indication  as  to  when  precisely  Alexander
encountered the work of Wright. Depending on the date of this encounter (before or
after 1920), Wright may or may not have directly influenced Alexander’s views about
emergence. In any case, as Edward Madden (1964: 75) has noted, Alexander “was more
than  impressed  with  it  and  projected  ideas  like  Wright’s  into  his  own  full-blown
doctrine  of  emergence.”  However,  Madden  continues,  “Wright  would  not  have
approved this destiny of his little idea, for Alexander even had God as an emergent
event.”
In the light of these last remarks, I shall now turn my attention to Chauncey Wright,
whose emergentist and pragmatic thought deserves to be examined more deeply than
it has been done in literature so far.
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2. Chauncey Wright’s Pragmatic Empiricism
2.1 A “Forgotten American Philosopher”
Chauncey  Wright6 was  a  North  American  philosopher, best  known today as  the “
coryphaeus” (CP 5.12) of the Metaphysical Club in Cambridge (Mass.) that around 1872 
gave birth to American Pragmatism. Almost all Club members (including William James
and Charles S. Peirce) were Wright’s old friends and their philosophical thought was
deeply  influenced  by  him.  With  his  brilliant epistemological  interpretation of the
evolutionary theory, Wright can be considered a kind of philosophical intermediary who
helped promote that fruitful interaction between pragmatist thought and the Darwinist
tradition, which still produces fruitful results both in philosophy and in biology.7 
Wright was interested at first in William Hamilton’s “philosophy of the conditioned,”
but  in  the  1960’s  he  converted to  the  utilitarian  and  associationist  philosophy  of 
Bentham, Bain and the two Mills. Wright was not only an original positivist thinker,
who held that the job of philosophy was to unify or organize the sciences,8 but he was
himself  a  scientist,  equipped  with  scientific  expertise  in  several  fields,  from
mathematics to botany, from physics to biology. When Darwin’s Origin of Species (1859)
appeared in the USA, Wright immediately declared himself a staunch Darwinian (LCW:
43)  and  tried  to  combine  the  theoretical  cornerstones  of  the  “descent  with
modification” theory with utilitarian and associationist philosophy. Wright spent more
than  ten  years  studying  Darwin’s  theory  and  he  deeply  understood  its  scientific
meaning and philosophical relevance, as witnessed by Darwin himself (LCW: 230-1). In
his  evolutionist  papers,  in  a  pure  positivist  spirit, Wright  not  only  defended  the
scientific principle of natural selection, but also investigated the logic that inspired
Darwin’s theory and grasped its theoretical core in a way that was far ahead of his
times. 
Limits of Natural Selection (1870) is the earliest article on the evolutionary theory and it
reviews Alfred R. Wallace’s essay by the same title (1870). In this essay and in (1869),
Wallace denies that natural selection could ever explain the origin and evolution of the
most typical human traits. Wright’s criticisms of Wallace’s arguments were appreciated
by Darwin, who even quoted Wright’s work twice in Descent of Man (1871, II: 335, fn.31;
391). Given Darwin’s interest, in June 1871 Wright wrote to him, attaching the draft of a
second essay, On the Genesis of Species (1871a). In this text too, Wright sided with Darwin,
this time against  the  serious  criticism that  the  British  biologist  George Mivart  had
advanced in a text bearing the same title (Mivart 1871). Wright wrote to Darwin that
his paper had the “special  purpose” of  contributing to the evolutionary theory “by
placing  it  in  its  proper  relations  to  philosophical  inquiries  in  general”  (LCW:  230).
Darwin answered enthusiastically: “I have hardly ever in my life received an article
which has given me so much satisfaction.” (LCW: 230). He asked Wright for permission
to  reprint  the  paper,  at  his  own  expense,  as  a  pamphlet  in  the  UK.  That  was  the
beginning of a fruitful correspondence, which lasted until Wright’s sudden death, in
September 1875. 
In 1872, Wright set off on a European journey for a few months and spent two days with
the great naturalist and his family in the famous Down House. Here, Wright and Darwin
discussed  the  possibility  of  dealing  with  the  problem of  the  evolutionary  origin  of
human self-consciousness and its possible differences with respect to the mind of other
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animals. Together they planned to lay the foundations of a new field of research, called
Psychozoölogy (LCW:  248).  Wright’s  most  important  essay,  The  Evolution  of  Self-
Consciousness (1873), should have been the inaugural text of that grandiose project (see
below,  section 4).  Unfortunately,  Wright  died  shortly  afterwards  before  completing
what, according to Schneider (1946: 351), “if he had lived to develop it, would certainly
have been one of the major works in history of American thought.”
Except for Madden’s work, consisting of two general monographs (1963, 1964) and a
good number of essays, there are very few pages dedicated to Wright, who today is
largely a “forgotten philosopher.”9 Furthermore,  those few scholars who have dealt
with this philosopher have examined more general aspects of his thought, such as his
philosophy of science, his theory of knowledge, and his criticism of metaphysics. Others
have just tried to draw a comparison between Wright’s philosophy and pragmatist and
neo-positivist thought, to determine if this thinker should be regarded as a “founder,”
“precursor” or “forerunner” of these later philosophical currents. Moreover, most of
the very few pages that scholars have devoted to Wright’s philosophy of biology were
wrote before 1980, and none of them try to analytically compare Wright’s Darwinism,
including  his  notion  of  “novelty,”  with  the  epistemological  approach  prevalent  in
modern evolutionism and emergentist debates. The attitude of most American scholars 
towards Wright’s work is best expressed by the judgment formulated by Madden (1964:
108), according to  whom “we can ignore Wright’s biological view […]  because  it is 
philosophically irrelevant.” 
Despite all  this,  Wright’s reflections on biology and evolution appear very relevant,
first of all in order to better understand those aspects that make Wright’s philosophy
very similar to the emergentist approach and pragmatist attitude. Furthermore, they
are of great interest when compared to today’s debates on evolution and emergence.
Given these reasons, this article aims to examine Wright’s evolutionary philosophy and
to discuss the application of his “emergentist” approach to the paradigmatic issue of
the origin of human self-consciousness.
 
2.2 Wright’s “Forward-Looking” Empiricism
Wright began to study The Origin of Species in detail immediately after its publication.
However, he published almost nothing on the topic for the subsequent ten years. In the
1960’s,  Wright’s  interest focused mainly on  the  structure of  scientific  thought in
general.
One of the most significant writings from that period is The Philosophy of Herbert Spencer 
(1865a), where  Wright not  only criticizes Spencer’s  philosophy effectively,  but  also 
carries out some interesting analyses of the scientific method in general. “[W]hatever
be the origin of  the theories of  science, whether from a systematic examination of 
empirical facts by conscious induction, or from the natural biases of the mind,” Wright
claimed, “the value of these theories can only be tested […] by an appeal to sensible
experience, by deductions from them of consequences which we can confirm by the 
undoubted testimony of the senses” (PD: 47). In other words, the value of any scientific
hypothesis is  measured  not by  looking  at  the  way  it  comes  into  being,  but by
examining the effects produced when it is tested through “concrete experiences of a
kind  common  to  all” (LCW:  97) . S cientists  are  interested  much  more  in the
consequences of a tested hypothesis than in the method used to obtain it. 
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For “traditional” empiricists such as Hume and Mill, all human knowledge derives from
sensible experience. This view mainly focuses on the way a scientific idea originates,
and it usually results in the prescription that scientific hypotheses should derive from
sensible experience. Although Wright defines himself as a follower of the empiricist
tradition, he actually reverses its theoretical assumptions by considering the origin of a
scientific hypothesis irrelevant: “when and however ideas are developed science cares
nothing, for it is only by subsequent tests of sensible experience that ideas are admitted
into pandects of science.” (PD: 47).  Scientific hypotheses should produce a series of
predictions that  can be  tested in  sensible  experience and lead,  in  turn,  to new
observations and truths. Science does not care about the “ontological pedigree or a
priori character of a theory,” but it is “content to judge it by its performance” (PD: 47),
as a “theory which is utilized receives the highest possible certificate of truth” (PD: 51). 
The usefulness of a hypothesis appears to be a perfect criterion of verification, insofar
as it provides the kind of parameters of certainty that science has been able to apply 
extensively in the interpretation of natural phenomena. Moreover, Wright states that
the notion of utility is related to the “instrumental” use of scientific ideas for “their 
capacity to enlarge our experience by bringing to notice residual phenomena, and making
us observe what we have entirely overlooked” (PD: 55; italics mine). Scientific ideas
should prove their value as instruments that, once immersed into experience, are able
to  extend it  and unearth  what  we  had ignored in  previous  observations.  Scientific
hypotheses are thus “working ideas, – finders, not merely summaries of truth” (PD: 56; italics
mine) and they pragmatically define their value according to their operational capacity
to find or produce truths. They are effective working hypotheses leading us to new truths
and not  simply records  or  enumerations  of  observations  leading to  mere inductive
generalizations. 
Wright’s empiricism differs from British empiricism, as it aims to re-orient the focus of 
philosophical  and scientific inquiry by  diverting attention away from the  origin of
concepts and hypotheses, and directing it to the control of their consequences. While
the traditional empiricists were interested in showing that every hypothesis should
derive from experience, Wright insisted that the origin of a theory is indifferent, and
the key point is to consider the future consequences that hypotheses produce. In other
words, Wright turned “classic” empiricism into a new kind of empiricism that we may
define as “forward-looking” (see Madden 1964: 124-6).
Although these remarks do not allow us to consider Wright’s forward-looking approach
as thoroughly pragmatist,  they allow us to regard it  as an important guideline that
strongly points towards a rising pragmatism (Parravicini 2012). An essential element
that connotes the so-called “pragmatist revolution” is precisely the move to put the
role of “effects” at the center and insist on what “real difference” any idea entails in
terms of conceivable consequences as a method to clarify its meaning.10 This is the core
idea  behind  Peirce’s  pragmatic  maxim  (e.g.,  CP  5.402)  and  James’  definition  of
pragmatism, which consists in “the attitude of looking away from first  things,  principles,
‘categories,’ supposed necessities; and of looking towards the last things, fruits, consequences,
facts” (James 1978: 32). 
Furthermore, Wright’s definition of scientific ideas as “working hypotheses” is a very
pragmatist one (see Pearce 2020: ch.7). Dewey used almost the same Wright’s words to
describe  the  theoretical  shift  leading  from  classical  empiricism  to  pragmatist
instrumentalism, which 
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presents  itself  as  an  extension  of  historical  empiricism  with  this  fundamental
difference, that it does not insist upon antecedent phenomena but upon consequent
phenomena […]  and this  change in  point  of  view is  almost  revolutionary  in  its
consequences. An empiricism which is content with repeating facts already past has
no place for possibility and for liberty. It cannot find room for general conceptions
or ideas, at least no more than to consider them as summaries or records. But when
we take the point of view of pragmatism we see that general ideas have a very
different role  to play […].  They are  the  bases  for  organizing  future  observations  and
experiences. (Dewey 1925b: 365-6; italics mine)
Despite these similarities,  Wright never generalized his epistemological approach to
scientific hypotheses by developing it into a pragmatist theory. Nevertheless, Wright’s
forward-looking  strategy could  be  considered  an  incipient  pragmatist  conception, 
probably  emerging from the frequent  and prolonged philosophical  discussions that 
Wright entertained from the 1960’s with Peirce,  James and his  other friends at  the
Metaphysical Club.
As we will see in the next section, the philosophical move towards a forward-looking
empiricism is closely related to Wright’s examination of Darwin’s evolutionary theory. 
 
3. Evolution and the Notion of “Novelty” 
3.1 Wright Between Darwinism and Pragmatism
The  “history  of  evolutionism  is  intimately  linked  with  the  genesis  of  Pragmatism”
(Wiener 1949:  30).  Since the Metaphysical  Club period,  Wright,  Peirce,  James and the
other companions perceived the epochal importance of the evolutionary theory and
investigated its logic through their peculiar pragmatic approach, which in turn was
fueled  by  Darwin’s  perspective.  Later,  Dewey  and  Mead  further  strengthened  that
powerful  bond  holding  together  the  evolutionary  perspective  and  the  pragmatist
approach. 
Wright  is  “our  key  figure”  to  understand  the  link  between  evolutionism  and
Pragmatism in all of its different forms (Wiener 1949: 33). In two essays published in
the  very  years  of  the  Metaphysical  Club meetings,  Wright  (1871a,  1872)  defended
Darwin’s  theory  against  Mivart’s  attacks,  at  the  same  time  reflecting  on  some
philosophical aspects of the evolutionary theory. As regards Darwin’s use of “accidental
variation,” Wright clarifies that “accidental” does not refer to pure chance, but to the
incapacity  to foresee  the  occurrence  of  variations due  to  the  presence of an
inextricable interplay of factors (PD: 130-3). The word “chance” reflects the occurrence
of complex phenomena, which originate from a series of intertwined causal chains that
we are not able to disentangle for the purpose of prediction (PD: 173-4).
Regarding this aspect,  Wright pointed to a fundamental feature of Darwin’s theory, 
namely that the causal level of variations and that of natural selection should be considered
independent from each other. This means that individual variations, which are “constant
and normal in a race,” have to be regarded as “accidentally related to the advantages
that come from them.” Similarly, we say, “a tendril, or a tentacle […] is accidentally
related to the object it succeeds in finding” or “that it was by ‘accident’ that a certain
tendril  was put forth so as to fulfill  its  function, and clasp the particular object by
which it supports the vine.” In other words, “The search was and continues to be, normal
and general, it is the particular success only that is accidental” (PD: 143-4; italics mine).
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Wright identifies two distinct meanings in Darwin’s use of “accident” and “chance” in
relation to variations. In a sense, the latter are called “accidental” as they cannot be
predicted, owing to human ignorance about the causes producing them. Even today,
scientists  believe  that  genetic  mutations  are  produced  by  specific  causes  (e.g.,
radiations, chemical mutagens, etc.), but they consider it useless and almost impossible
to identify the precise factors that, from time to time, produce mutations in certain
DNA portions within an infinitesimal timeframe. 
The second, and more interesting, meaning of the word “chance” regards the fact that
variations are accidental in relation to their “particular success,” i.e. to the (positive,
negative or irrelevant) consequences they have for organic forms. In other words, the
reasons for the origin of given variations are largely independent of the function or
value that these variations possess, once they have entered in the dynamic context of
environmental relationships, in which every variation is subject to the severe sieve of
natural selection (Parravicini 2012: 148-9; Pievani 2015: 2).11 Variations are fundamental
for the evolutionary process, because they provide the fuel without which no selective
process could take place. Nevertheless, the origin of variations is attributable to a range
of causes independent of environmental conditions (i.e., “selective pressures”) and of
any  results  in  terms  of  phenotype  performances.  Such  contingent interweaving  of
different causal levels leads to the differential survival (i.e., natural selection) of some
organisms  compared  to  others,  statistically  based  on  the  advantage  produced  by
certain variations with respect to others. This is the reason why Wright states that “the
origin  of  that  which  through service  to  life  has  been  preserved,  is  to  this  process
arbitrary, indifferent, accidental (in the logical sense of this word), or non-essential.
This origin has no part in the process.” (PD: 252). From Wright’s point of view, it is not
important  to  know  precisely  what  causes  have  given  rise to  a  certain  “accidental”
variation, but to examine the actual consequences of a variation.
In  the  wake  of  Wright’s  analyses,  we  may  apply  to  Darwinian  explanations  Mill’s
warning about confusing the origin of an idea with its emerging value (see par.1.2). In
other words, the causes of the origin of variations should not be confused with the
selected effects related to their value for life. American paleontologist Stephen Jay Gould,
who warned us to keep separate the reasons for the origin of structures or behaviors
from their current meaning for life, recently reaffirmed the same admonition (Gould
2002: ch. XI). 
Wright claims that the process subtended by the misleading term “evolution” (PD: 199) 
does  not  refer,  as  traditionally  believed,  to  an  “aprioristic”  process involving  a
“relation of beginning and end – a development” (Wright 1866: 725). Evolution is not an
unfolding of properties already implicitly present from the beginning or a movement
directed towards a predetermined path, similarly to “an epic poem” that is  divided
into “a beginning, a middle, and an end” (PD: 73-4). Darwin has generated a radical
break  with all  those  cosmic-evolutionary  views “which  make  the  cause  to  be
engendered  by  the  effect”  (PD:  101).  There  is  no  immanent  design,  but  only  an
accumulation of variations selected for reasons that are independent from those for
which they arose.  There  is  no linear  or  unidirectional  movement,  but  a  process  of
sedimentations and additions (PD: 262) in which the preserved variations contingently
constrain and influence the direction of the process. 
In  such  an  evolutionary  process,  where  the  effects  of  the  contingent  causal plots 
become visible only in retrospect, any variation is comparable to a sort of hypothesis that
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can only be validated as useful or discarded as irrelevant or harmful in the future. All
variations, however they may have arisen, “are beginnings, not ends; potentialities, not
finalities;  candidates  for  office,  not  appointments  due  to  their  inherent  goodness”
(Chambliss 1960: 146). 
A clear analogy emerges here between Wright’s interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary
theory and the ratio of  effects characterizing what we have called “forward-looking”
empiricism (par. 2.2). According to this forward-looking logic, the value of a scientific
hypothesis is tested through the consequences that follow from its implementation in
sensible experience. In the same way, the value of any organic variation is measured
once it has passed through the sieve of natural selection, based on the consequences it
has generated for the life of organisms. Max H. Fisch (1966: 15) perfectly summed up
this analogy: 
The  experimental  theory  of  knowledge  [i.e.,  the  pragmatic  approach]  owed  its
prevalence among us in part to Darwinian analogies. It is but a more general form
of  the  philosophy  of  science  which  makes  much  of  hypothesis,  prediction  and
experiment,  and  make’s  little  of  Bacon’s  and  Mill’s  methods  of  induction.  The
analogies lie between the hypothesis and the spontaneous variation on the one hand,
and  between  the  experiment and  natural  selection on  the  other  [ …].  What  tests  a
scientific hypothesis is future experiment, not the observations from which it sprang.
The value of an organic variation is selectively tested in terms of its usefulness in the 
struggle for life, just as the “cash value” (James 1978: 35, 117) of an idea is tested in
terms of the conceivable consequences it generates in experience. In conclusion, this
kind of  forward-looking approach developed by Wright can be considered a crucial 
aspect tightly linking together Darwinism and pragmatism. 
 
3.2 Evolutionary Novelties
The notion of novelty is crucial in Wright’s evolutionary philosophy and closely related
to  the  classical  concept  of  emergence.  Wright  tried  to  combine  Mill’s  associationist
framework (included his  emergentist  analyses  –  see  par. 1.2)  with  his  own original
interpretation of Darwin’s theory. In such a framework, the notion of “novelty” is the
key  concept  through  which  Wright  tried  to  understand  the  deep  nature  of  living
phenomena, which he considered “a higher form of chemistry” (LCW: 204).
In a letter dated 22 March 1870, Wright declares that the apparently regular patterns of
life are the result of infinitely complicated plots made of different causal lines giving
rise to a self-conserving equilibrium. Life builds a contingent multi-level order out of
the  physical  and  chemical  laws  of  the  universe,  but  this  “order”  is  “an  entirely
exceptional and precarious state of things” (LCW: 177). Living forms ultimately show
the “same mixed character of regularity and apparent accident” as all other natural
phenomena, which is to say the same “infinitely complex and confused movement […]
of action and counteraction in the balanced forces from which they spring” (PD: 5).
Nevertheless, Wright considered the biological sciences to be radically different from
other  scientific  fields,  like  mechanical  physics  or  astronomy.  Against  Mivart,  who
considered  biology  “essentially  a  branch of  physical  science,”  Wright  defended the
autonomy of living phenomena, which show their own peculiar (we might say emergent)
patterns and processes – like natural selection – which are “operative in nature but not
reducible to the laws of physical science.”12
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The accidental features that combine with the linear operation of physical-mechanical
laws pervade the natural world and show all their evidence in the phenomena of life.
Wright clearly showed the complete reversal operated by Darwinian logic with respect
to  any  “aprioristic”  view  of  natural  processes  (see  par. 3.1).  Each  new  event  or
combination of events, like a variation in some trait of a given organism, may produce
unpredictable  consequences  in  the  economy  of  life  and  modify  the  course  of  the
evolutionary  process.  As  we  began  to  see  in  the  previous  paragraph,  according  to
Wright evolutionary novelties emerge at the crossroad between the causal plots that
produce any given variation, and those occurring at the different level of ecological/
environmental interactions, in which the same emerging variation concretely operates.
In such a multi-level evolutionary framework, the occurrence of a new trait may take
the  form  of  an  authentic  novelty whether  it  exhibits  characters  different  and
unpredictable from those of the antecedent conditions that give rise to it. In the wake
of Mill’s analyses, Wright (1873) argues that 
Experimental science, as in chemistry, is full of examples of the discovery of new
properties or new powers, which, so far as the conditions of their appearance were
previously  known,  did  not  follow  from  antecedent  conditions,  except  in  an
incidental manner, – that is, in a manner not then foreseen to be involved in them;
and these effects became afterwards predictable from what had become known to
be their antecedent conditions only by the empirical laws of rules which inductive
experimentation had established. (PD: 201)
Unpredictable novelties can always emerge from a set  of antecedent conditions that
have characteristics qualitatively different from what emerges from their combination.
In Wright’s view, the natural world is a “great alchemic experiment” which employs
“all the influences of nature and all the ages of the world” (PD: 167). In such a great
“work of creative power,” any accidental  combination of factors could open up the
possibility of the emergence of new qualities. 
Wright specifies that any “really new power in nature” is “only involved potentially in
previous phenomena,” as in the case of “the power of flight in the first birds” (PD: 200). 
However, the term “potentially” here does not refer to a pre-formational process of “
evolutio,”13 i.e.  to  a  process  in  which  a  latent  potentiality  is  already  involved  and
progressively unfolds.  On the contrary, Wright understands novelty as an authentic
and unexpected event (cf.  Madden 1964: 74-6),  meaning that it cannot be rationally
attributed to potentialities contained in acknowledged antecedent conditions prior to
its first empirical occurrence. In other words, before the empirical experimentation has
been actually  conducted and registered,  it  is  not  possible  in  principle  to  rationally
foresee the occurrence of the novel fact, or explain whether it is “involved potentially”
in a set of given causes or conditions. Indeed, it is the inductive experimentation of the
novelty, the registration of its empirically verified effects, that retroactively enlightens
and establishes a-posteriori the “incidental” causes or antecedent conditions of those
novel effects, which from then on become predictable.
Wright clarifies that we should not posit a supernatural event behind the “appearance
of a really new power in nature.” Such events, although they are not deducible before
their first occurrence, are “still natural events,” where the word “nature” means “those
kinds of effects which, though they may have appeared but once in the whole history of
the world,  yet  appear dependent on conjunctions of  causes which would always be
followed  by  them.”  One  experiment  could  be  enough  to  establish  such  causal
dependence,  “though the  particular  law so  determined is  a  wholly  empirical  one.”
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“Scientific research implies the potential existence of the natures, classes, or kinds of
effects  which  experiment  brings  to  light  through  instances,  and  for  which  it  also
determines, in accordance with inductive methods, the previously unknown conditions
of their appearance.” (PD: 202). The novelty and the conditions of its occurrence can
thus be explained only in retrospect, after it has already happened at least one time. 
Wright’s  reflections  about  novelty,  on  the  one  hand,  appear  to  be  undoubtedly
undergirded  by  the  peculiar  scientific  positivism  and  forward-looking  empiricism
developed by the American thinker from the 1960’s. On the other hand, they closely
recall the reflections made by classical British emergentists, who also emphasized the
unpredictable  aspects  of  novel  entities  emerging  from  their  composing  parts  or
starting conditions (Stephan 1992). Like Wright, they did not deny the possibility, based
on experience, of making predictions about the nature of novel properties. They only
denied the possibility of deducing emergent properties from their basic conditions and
before having registered in the experience what these conditions actually bring about when they
come together (Zhok 2011: 62). Both Wright and classical emergentism agree that any
novelty is thus unpredictable in principle before it occurs and can only be postdictively
reconstructed starting from the effects, in order to infer the antecedent hypothetical
conditions.14
Wright’s analyses fit well even with some modern influential biological views. One of
the most eminent biologists of the 19th century, Ernst Mayr (1982: 53), uses the words
of Herbert A. Simon to define life phenomena as complex systems where “the whole is
more than the sum of the parts […] in the important pragmatic sense that, given the
properties of the parts and the laws of their interaction, it is not a trivial matter to
infer the properties of the whole.” There are “two reasons why biological events are so
often unpredictable: the great complexity of biological systems and the frequency at
which unexpected novelties emerge at higher hierarchical levels […]. These factors do
not weaken the principle of causality, conceived in a ‘postdictive’ sense.” (Ibid.:  58).
Within  this  very  Wrightian  framework,  Mayr  mentions  another  core  element  of
Wright’s thought, namely the idea of the “randomness of an event with respect to its
significance.” Quoting Karl Popper and Lloyd Morgan, Mayr concludes that “we live in a
universe of emergent novelty,” and that “such emergence is quite universal” (ibid.: 63).
 
4. Exaptive Emergent Novelties: Human Self-
Consciousness 
4.1 Wright and the Evolution of Self-Consciousness
The emergence of the human mind is a key issue both for the emergentist debate and
for the current research in the evolutionary field. In his major work, Wright (1873)
describes  the  origin  of  human  self-consciousness  as  a paradigmatic  example  of  an
authentic emergent novelty, i.e. a “really new power in nature.” Wright states that “no act
of self-consciousness, however elementary, may have been realized before man’s first
self-conscious  act  in  animal  world”  (PD:  200-1).  Human self-consciousness  is  a  real
novelty,  unpredictable  and  not  deducible  before  its  occurrence.  The  new  trait  is
recognized to be potentially involved in pre-existing powers or causes only after its
appearance in the animal world, in the sense explained in the previous section. Wright
provides an interesting image to further clarify this point:
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The derivation of this power, supposing it to have been observed by a finite angelic
(not animal) intelligence, could not have been foreseen to be involved in the mental
causes,  on  the  conjunction  of  which  it  might,  nevertheless,  have  been  seen  to
depend.  The  angelic  observation  would  have  been  a  purely  empirical  one.  The
possibility of  a subsequent analysis  of  these causes by the self-conscious animal
himself,  which would afford an explanation of their agency, by referring it  to a
rational combination of simpler elements in them, would not alter the case to the
angelic intelligence, just as a rational explanation of flight could not be reached by
such an intelligence as a consequence of known mechanical laws; since these laws
are also animal conditions, or rather are more general and material ones, of which
our angelic, spherical intelligence is not supposed to have had any experience. Its
observation of the conditions of animal flight would thus also be empirical. (PD: 
201)
Similarly to what the British emergentists will claim about fifty years later, Wright is
arguing that the emergence of the earliest acts of self-consciousness, such as those of
other living structures or capacities (e.g.,  flight),  is rationally explainable through a
series of antecedent conditions or causes that nonetheless may reveal features different
from, and incidental to, the novel trait resulting from them. However, before the new
emergent  quality  actually  occurs,  no  prediction  of  it  is  possible,  nor  any  rational
explanation in terms of antecedents or conditions of possibility, even if we imagine a
superhuman  angelic  intelligence  analyzing  the  entire  process.  In  other  words,  a
superhuman intelligence of this sort would not have been able to rationally foresee the
emergence  of  the  novel  power  of  human  self-consciousness  through  the  mere
observation or analysis of its mental antecedents or composing traits. As noted in the
previous section (§3.2), it is in principle impossible to deduce the emergence of a novelty
(e.g., human self-consciousness or flight) before any actual empirical observation of it,
and  only  through  a  mere  rational  analysis  of  its  composing  parts  or  antecedent
conditions. Even an angelic intelligence needs to empirically experience the novelty in
order to reconstruct the antecedent conditions of its emergence.
Both according to Wright and to classical emergentism, it is not crucial to admit that
the emergent novelty is contingently unpredictable or unexplainable because of the
relative  limits  of  scientific  knowledge  at  a  given  time.  What  it  is  fundamental  to
acknowledge for them is that the emergent properties or entities are in principle and
essentially unpredictable  and  non-deducible  (Zhok  2011:  53-69).  However,  such
unpredictability does not entail a complete elusiveness of the emergent novelty from a
rational  point  of  view.  Far  from  admitting  a  kind  of  creatio  continua or  arbitrary
unpredictability,  the  emergentist  thinker,  like  Wright,  claims  that  the  emergent
novelty should display a constant and regular link with its material conditions or basic
components.  Nonetheless,  both  the  constraining  link  and the  supervenience  of  the
emergent  novelty  cannot  be  foreseen  in  principle  before  the  emergent  property  actually
manifests itself. Once the emergence manifests itself empirically, it should be possible to
use the link with its material base to foresee the appearance of the same emerging
properties on future occasions. 
Furthermore,  Wright  argues  that  the  material  conditions  for  the  emergence  of  the
human mind are different from their result. Mental events belong to a new class of
phenomena, being a qualitative emergence that cannot be wholly deconstructed into
physical  atoms,  neuronal  movements or cerebral  areas.  Mental  events may be fully
conditioned by physical-cerebral processes, but the former are not entirely reducible to
the latter. Although the result is not reducible to its antecedent conditions, the process
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remains continuous from the point of view of natural laws, and rationally explainable
a-posteriori.
As Wright (1870) noted, it is worth spending intellectual energy to carry out empirical
research  on  “the  special  physical  antecedents,  concomitants,  and  consequents  of
special  sensations” or on the relations of  co-presence between physical  and mental
realities. 
[S]uch researches may succeed in reducing all other facts of actual experience, all
our  knowledge  of  nature,  and  all  our  thoughts  and  emotions  to  intelligible
modifications  of  these  simple  and  fundamental  existences;  but  the  attempt  to
reduce sensation to anything but sensation is as gratuitous and as devoid of any
suggestion or guidance of  experience […].  In one sense material  phenomena,  or
physical objective states, are causes or effects of sensations, bearing as they do the
invariable relations to them of antecedents, or concomitants, or consequents. But
these  are  essentially  empirical  relations,  explicable  perhaps  by  more  and  more
generalized empirical laws, but approaching in this way never one step nearer to an
explanation of  material  conditions by mental  laws,  or  of  mental  natures by the
forces of matter. Matter and mind co-exist. There are no scientific principles by
which either can be determined to be the cause of the other. (PD: 117-8)
In conclusion, according to Wright, the relation between mind and brain is not a cause-
effect relation, but one between two co-existent yet different dimensions, each with its
own irreducible specificity. In other words, mind is an irreducible emergent effect, not
an epiphenomenon of brain processes.
 
4.2 The Emergence of Self-Consciousness as the “New Use of Old 
Powers”
In the evolutionary framework described by Wright, the principle of “new uses” plays a
crucial role, closely related to the notion of “novelty.” As Wright (1873) argues,
new uses of old powers arise discontinuously both in the bodily and mental natures of
the animal, and in its individual developments, as well as in the development of its
race, although, at their rise, these uses are small and of the smallest importance to
life. They seem merged in the powers to which they are incident, and seem also
merged in the special purposes or functions in which, however, they really have no
part, and which are no parts of them. Their services or functions in life, though
realized only incidentally at first, and in the feeblest degree, are just as distinct as
they afterwards come to appear in their  fullest  development.  The new uses are
related to old powers only as accidents, so far as the special services of the older
powers are concerned […]. (PD:199-200)
The principle of “new uses of old powers,” sometimes called the “principle of uses,”
entails the aforementioned idea that each variation is accidental as far as purpose is
concerned (see section 3.1). Any trait may embody a plurality of new uses that could
unexpectedly  emerge  in  consequence  of  changes  in  the  ecological-environmental
niche. A trait that originally emerged in relation to certain uses may be later co-opted
for  further  functions  that  are  accidentally  involved,  or  the  same  function  may  be
realized by different traits that evolved for different uses. In Wright’s words, 
many mental as well as bodily powers thus have mixed natures, or independent
uses; as, for example, the powers of the voice to call and allure, to warn and repel,
and its uses in music and language; or the numerous uses of the human hand in
services of strength and dexterity. And, on the contrary, the same uses are, in some
cases, realized by independent organs as, for example, respiration in water and in
the air by gills and lungs, or flight by means of fins, feathers, and webs. (PD: 200)
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Wright  provides  many  other  examples  of  his  principle.  The  incipient  rattle  of  the
rattlesnake,  the  expanding neck of  the  cobra  (PD:  158-9)  and the  long neck of  the
giraffe (PD: 151-2) could all serve many different functions. Wright clarifies that “The
use  which may be  presumed in  general  to  govern selection is  a  combination,  with
various degrees of importance, of all the actual uses in a structure” (PD: 191); it is “the
combination  of  all  the  uses  that  are  of  importance  to  the  preservation  of  life.”
Therefore, to suppose that one of these uses was of little importance in the incipient
stage of a structure does not rule out “the existence of uses more important which
would afford grounds of advantage and competition in the struggle for life” (PD: 193).
Wright’s  idea that  the evolutionary process is  based on a reserve of  structural  and
functional redundancies makes this process more similar to one of tinkering, which
accidentally patches up old structures for new uses, rather than to the activity of an
engineer, who optimally designs and adapts every trait from the outset.15 In addition,
the principle of  new uses strengthens the admonition that  the causes of  variations
should not be confused with their value for life (see section 3.1). As the principle of uses
predicts that a trait which originally emerged in relation to certain uses or for no use at
all  may later  be co-opted for  different  functions,  it  also  implicitly  warns us  not  to
confuse the reasons for the origin of a given structure with the current uses of it. 
In the light of all this, it is not hard to see a close similarity between Wright’s principle
of uses and the evolutionary process called exaptation,  in the wake of Gould & Vrba
(1982)’s  proposal.16 This  principle  plays  a  crucial  role  among  modern  evolutionary
biologists, for whom the warning to keep the historical origin of a given feature distinct
from  its  current  use  is  as  valid  today  as  it  ever  was,  being  an  antidote  to  any
teleological or “adaptationist” interpretation.
Wright  (1870)  began to  propose  an  application of  his  principle  of  uses  to  contrast
Wallace’s argument on the impossibility for natural selection to account for the origin
of  the  most  typical  human  traits,  both  mental  and  physical.  Later, Wright  made 
extensive use of the same principle in an essay on phyllotaxis (Wright 1871b) and in
two  reviews  (Wright  1871a,  1872)  of  Mivart’s  Genesis  of  Species in  order to  defend
Darwin’s  theory,  especially  against  those  invoking “ the  incompetency  of  natural
selection to account for the incipient stages of useful structures” (Mivart 1871: ch.2). It
is noteworthy that the above-mentioned articles (except Wright 1872) appeared before
the publication of the Origin’s sixth edition, where Darwin added an entire chapter (the
seventh)  to  refute  objections  against  natural  selection  and  used,  against  Mivart,
arguments  very  similar  to  Wright’s.17 Even in  his  last letter  to Darwin  (Feb. 1875),
Wright  emphasized  the  central  role  of  the  “plurality  of  uses”  principle  within  the
architecture of evolutionary theory, whereas Darwin regarded it as a mere scholium
(LCW: 336). 
In The Evolution of Self-Consciousness (1873), Wright applied the principle of uses in order
to  rethink  the  origin of  human  mind  and  language,  thus  largely  anticipating
contemporary  scientists’ proposal  to  apply  the  exaptive  mechanism  as  a  means  to
account for the emergence of modern human cognition.18 According to Wright, a trait
or  a  power  which  originated  in  relation  to  certain  functions  may be  coopted  for
different  uses.  In  Gould’s  words  (2002:  1226), the  wing may have been selected for
reasons different from flight, i.e., for thermo-regulative functions or for no function at
all, and then coopted for flight. Similarly, to Wright, the human mind evolved through
new  uses  of  some  old  powers,  namely  through  a  new  capacity  to  remember  and
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manipulate signs. In Wright’s analysis, “internal images or successions of images which
are the representative imaginations of  objects and their relations” are “effective as
notative, directive or guiding elements in thought” not only for humans, in whom they
are  supplemented  by  names,  but  also  in  “dumb animals,”  for  which  they  serve  as
“instruments of thought in judgement and reasoning” (PD: 208). However, even in the
most intelligent animals, those images are so “vague and feeble” that “they cannot be
associated with outward signs in such a manner as to make these distinctly appear as
substitutes, or signs equivalent to them” (PD: 209). Those images that act as signs “in
governing  trains  of  thought  and  reasoning,”  in  the  animal  mind  are  immediately
forgotten, “merged in the things signified, like stars in the light of the sun,” as the
outward signs are much more vivid. 
The emergence of the human mind is the consequence of a new use of those internal images,
made  possible  by  “an  extension  of  the  range  in  powers  of  memory,  or  in  revived
impressions.”  Selected  variations  in  the  mental  powers  of  proto-humans  were  the
conditions for the emergence of human intelligence, allowing it “to fix its attention on
a vivid outward sign, without losing sight of […] an image or revived impression” which
serves as “a sign of the same thing, or the same event” (PD: 210; italics mine). For the first
time, internal images were recognized as “representative images,” namely as signs for
outward  objects  and  external  images.  This  new  use  opened  up  the  possibility  of
recognizing representative images as “my thoughts, or our thoughts, or as phenomena
of the mind” (PD: 216). They now came to be recognized as general signs that could be
intentionally used even in the absence of the corresponding impressions. “This would
plant the germ of the distinctively human form of self-consciousness.” (PD: 210).
It  is  not  my aim here  to  explain Wright’s  hypothesis  on the origin of  human self-
consciousness  in  detail.  It  is  sufficient  to  emphasize  the  importance  of  Wright’s
evolutionary  logic  of  effects  and  the  crucial  role  played  by  the  idea  of  emergent
novelties and new uses. A gradual and continuous sedimentation of small accidental
variations  in  a  series  of  traits,  selected  in  relation  to  some  favorable  reasons  and
functions,  may  give  rise  to  qualitatively  different  and  unexpected  emergent
consequences. In the case of human consciousness, a combination of different factors –
such as a gradual strengthening of memory and attention, a gradual encephalization,
and a continuous development of phonatory structures – may have set the bases for a
functional  shift  in the proto-human mind towards a  new use of  internal  images as
signs.  In  Wright’s  words,  “reflection is  a  distinct  faculty,  and though,  perhaps,  not
peculiar to man, is in him so prominent and marked in its effects on the development
of the individual mind, that it may be regarded as his most essential and elementary
distinction in kind. For differences of degrees in causes may make differences of kinds
in effects.” (PD: 217). 
The principle of uses thus has a strategic function when integrated with the notion of
“novelty,” as it can bring together in a coherent way the discontinuous event of the
novelty, in the form of a functional shift, and the continuous tissue of the evolutionary
process,  i.e.  the  continuity  of  the  evolving  bodily  traits  from  which  the  new  use
emerges.  As  regards  human  self-consciousness,  a  small  functional  shift  within  the
continuous  tissue  of  the  bodily  structure  may  have  accidentally  triggered  the
emergence of “a really new power in nature” that no examination of the antecedent
conditions  could  ever  have  foreseen,  before  the  actual  manifestation  of  the  power
itself. 
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Furthermore,  in  Wright’s  view,  every  emerging  novelty  or  new  use  can  produce
“incidental  developments”  that  may  modify  the  evolutionary  trajectory,  implicitly
suggesting the possibility of a kind of downward causation. This is another aspect that
brings Wright very close to the British emergentists, and to Lloyd Morgan above all. For
both  thinkers,  the  emergent  novelty  may  generate  downward  consequences  that
change “the way pre-existent events run their course,” thereby causing them to be
“altered in the context of that new kind of relatedness” (El Hani & Pihlström 2002: 2-3).
The emergence of the human self-consciousness is a paradigmatic example, owing to
the significant evolutionary effects generated after its emergence, such as, in Wright’s
words, “the traditions of language, with all the knowledge, histories, arts and sciences
involved  and  embodied  in  them.”  All  these  consequences  that  have  irreversibly
modified the course of evolution “are developments incidental […] to the existence and
exercise of self-consciousness […] and were added to them rather than evolved from
them” (PD: 262). This process, which is far from constituting some kind of instructive
or  pre-formational  development,19 clearly  exemplifies  what  Wright  means  by
“novelty,” i.e.  an inedited emergence from a combination of causes which produces
incidental side effects that can in turn change the evolutionary trajectory.
 
5. Neutral Monism and Pragmatic Realism
One of the most important side effects of the emergence of human self-consciousness is
the  ability  to  distinguish  between  “inner”  and  “outward”  phenomena.  As  Wright
argues, such a distinction between mental and external phenomena is the product of
inferences  on  signs,  not  a  magical  “intuitive  distinction,”  as  supposed  by  “most
metaphysicians”  (PD:  219).  Before  a  phenomenon  is  judged  to  be  “internal”  or
“external,” “real” or “mental,” it is neutral and completely indistinct with respect to
those divisions. The ability of attribution, Wright claims, “comes either from the direct
observation of our progenitors, or,  possibly, through the natural selection, of them;
that is, possibly through the survival of those who rightly divided the worlds, and did
not often mistake a real danger from a dream” (PD: 231). 
The human mind classifies experiences for pragmatic reasons of survival, and in doing
so  it  creates  the  distinction  between  “self”  and  “world,”  between  “inside”  and
“outside,”  between  “mind”  and  “body.”  These  distinctions  are  not  already  given  a
priori, as the Cartesians thought, but are consequences of the evolutionary process. At
the outset, when a phenomenon is still “unattributed” to the “internal” or “external”
world,  there  is  neutrality between  the  two  worlds.  This  is  the  reason  why  Wright
claimed that “matter and mind co-exist” (see section 4.1).
Madden defined Wright’s position as “neutral monism” (Madden 1954, 1963: 128-42)
and regarded it as being very similar to James’ idea of “pure experience,” according to
which the phenomena of consciousness are originally neutral and assume a functional-
adaptive role through experience.20
Wright’s view, which is critical of any form of dualism, natural realism or idealism, is
reminiscent  of  the  “pragmatic  realism”  characterizing  the  subsequent  pragmatist
philosophy, according to which something is real when it produces effects on us or
somewhere.  In an article devoted to Masson’s  Recent  British Philosophy (1866),  Wright
argued that 
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A  question  is  closed  when  we  have  a  knowledge  precluding  the  possibility  of
evidence  to  the  contrary,  or  where  we  are  ignorant  beyond  the  possibility  of
enlightenment.  An  ontological  knowledge  of  the  supernatural,  or  even  of  the
natural – that is, a knowledge of anything existing by itself and independently of its
effects on us – is, according to the experiential philosophy, a closed question. (PD:
348; italics mine) 
This position, which is foundational to Wright’s peculiar positivism (cf. Pearce 2015:
448-9), is further clarified in a letter to Francis E. Abbott (1867), where Wright states
that what something is actually coincides with the phenomenon, namely with what is
knowable,  and  that,  conversely,  the  knowable  is  everything  that  is:  “To  say  the
phenomena are all that exists is to say that, in knowing phenomena, we know all the
natures that exist.” (LCW: 131). In other words, being is its effects and coincides with
what is knowable, similarly to what Peirce would argue shortly thereafter in Questions
Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man (1868). 
What Wright claims concerning the crucial importance of effects for the definition of
what really exists or what is actually knowable perfectly fits with the above-mentioned
“forward-looking empiricism” (see section 2.2) and is another crucial clue that brings
Wright’s thought closer to the genuine sense of “the pragmatist revolution.” 
Traces of  “pragmatic realism” emerge again when Wright,  in his  essay on Spencer,
defines the meaning of scientific concepts in terms of their effective use and of their
sensible  effects  in  concrete  experience:  “Chemical  forces  are  not  mathematically
comprehended, and are therefore utterly unknown, save in their effects, and their laws
are unknown, save in the observed invariable orders of these effects” (PD: 79; italics
mine).  The  same  idea  is  expressed  in  Wright  (1865b):  “Do  we  know  more  of  the
phenomenon, viewed without reference to other phenomena, by saying it is produced
by force? Certainly not. All we know or see is the effect; we do not see force, – we see
motion or moving matter.”21
These  pragmatic  elements  connoting  Wright’s  “forward-looking  empiricism”  seem
particularly significant if we consider that, according to El-Hani and Pihlström (2002:
33), a form of pragmatic realism can provide a key theoretical contribution to better
understand the notion of “emergence” and to overcome the theoretical problems that
are involved in “the purely ontological, metaphysically realist treatment of emergence
typical of most contemporary approaches.” El-Hani and Pihlström (2002: 22, 24-5) claim
that a “pragmatic realism,” which is “inherently pluralistic and anti-reductionistic,”
supports the idea that “ontology is not clearly separable from epistemology” and that
“emergent properties are not metaphysically real  independently of  our practices of
inquiry  but  gain  their  ontological  status  from  the  practice-laden  ontological
commitments we make.” Therefore, pragmatism (and, we may add, Wright’s forward-
looking empiricism) “might serve as a background philosophical framework supporting
a ‘mildly realist’ interpretation of the reality of […] emergent properties” as dependent
“on human ontological classifications, although we should, in the spirit of reasonable
naturalism,  say  that  they  have  (diachronically)  ‘emerged’  out  of  the  non-human
world.”
 
6. Concluding Remarks
The notions of “novelty” and “emergence” have been examined through the original
lens of Wright’s pragmatic and evolutionary philosophy. Wright never used the term
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“emergence,” which was introduced in its technical sense by Lewes (1875) in the year of
Wright’s death. However, in the light of what has emerged here, Wright’s reference
both to living phenomena in terms of novelties unexpectedly appearing in the
evolutionary process, and to the human mind as an evolutionary emergent novelty,
represents much more than “a kind of embryonic emergentist view,” as Madden (1964:
74) wrote. Wright’s reflections, combining Mill’s emergentism and Darwin’s
evolutionism, project his thought into the future, since they prove to be very close to
later developments in classical pragmatist thought and British emergentism, and even
to some more recent perspectives in evolutionary biology. 
As Brioschi (2019:  2.2) has recently noted, the ideas of irreducible “novelty” and of
“mind in evolution” represent two key traits  that classical  pragmatism shares with
British emergentism. Both these notions have been shown to lie at the core of Wright’s
philosophical analyses.
Significantly,  Samuel  Alexander  “was  very  impressed”  by  Wright’s  thought  and
expressed  ideas  very  similar  to  Wright’s  with  his  1920  doctrine  of  emergence  (see
par. 1.3). On the pragmatist front, beyond James and Peirce, whose philosophical views
were directly influenced by Wright’s thought, an emergentist position in many respects
close to Wright’s was expressed by Mead, especially in The Philosophy of the Present.22
Furthermore, Mead (1934) adopted an idea similar to Wright’s one of “new uses of old
powers” in describing the emergence of the human “mind” as the outcome of a new use
of the vocal gesture. 
Wright’s conception of “novelty,” incorporated both into an original evolutionary view
and  into  an  embryonic  pragmatist  framework,  radically  transformed  Mill’s
emergentism. It is very likely that Wright borrowed his own emergentist framework
from the two Mills  and the associationist  tradition,  which provided a useful  key to
interpret Wright’s conception of living processes. However, as Sini (1972: 84-5) pointed
out, the associationist notion of “analysis” is a static procedure that can still  throw
light  on a  mosaic  of  factors,  but  which “cannot  grasp or  foresee the whole  of  this
mosaic, neither for what refers to the past, nor for what concerns the future.” In the
light  of  these  words,  we  may  claim  that  Wright  was  able  to  transfer  the  idea  of
emergent novelty from the static conceptual framework of associationism to the much
more dynamic Darwinian evolutionary thought.  In Wright’s  eyes,  the “descent with
modification” theory represented an element capable of transforming the principle of
utility into a valid criterion for the genealogical reconstruction of the constitution of
complex elements. In this sense, I fully agree with Peirce, who once told Wright that
Darwin’s “ideas of development had more vitality” than Mill’s conceptions, and that
this “little vine clinging to the tree of  Associationalism, […] after a time […] would
inevitably kill the tree” (CP 5.64, 1903). 
In conclusion, Wright’s thought can be interpreted as a crucial landmark not only to
enlighten the strategic connection between Darwinism and pragmatism, but also to
better understand the key transition from associationist interpretations of emergence
to  later  philosophical  and  biological  debates  (from  British  emergentism  onwards).
Modern discussions on emergence are no longer nourished by the “Associationist tree,”
but rather – as Peirce correctly predicted – by Darwin’s original “little vine.” This has
grown into a very solid tree, supporting the entire research program of the biological
sciences, nourishing a wide variety of other scientific disciplines, and constituting for
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philosophy – even today – “the greatest precipitant of new methods, new intentions,
new problems” (Dewey 1910: 19).
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NOTES
1. See Beckerman, Flohr & Kim 1992; Bedau & Humphreys 2008; Clayton & Davis 2006; Corradini
& O’Connor 2010; Francescotti 2007; Kauffman 2019; Kim 1999, 2006; Okasha 2012; Pihlström 2002;
Seidel & Greve 2017; Van Gulick 2001. 
2. See  Stephan 1992  for  a  historical  and  conceptual  reconstruction  of  the  different  outlines
characterizing the emergentist tradition.
3. To  quote  a  couple  of  examples,  in  Experience  and  Nature Dewey  defines  his  philosophical
reflections about mind as “an attempt to contribute to what has come to be called an ‘emergent’
theory of mind” (Dewey 1925a: 271), while Schiller examines the notions of “emergence” and
“novelty” in his article entitled Creation, Emergence, Novelty (1930). See El-Hani & Pihlström 2002;
Sawyer 2002; Doat & Sartenaer 2014; Baggio 2015, and the articles in this EJPAP special issue,
some of which also compare James and Peirce’s pragmatism with the emergentist tradition. 
4. For further bibliographic details, see Brioschi (2019: 2.1).
5. Laski recalls this episode in a letter dated 3 September 1931 and addressed to Oliver Wendell
Holmes Jr. (1841-1935), a judge of the US Supreme Court and a crucial figure of the Metaphysical
Club in Cambridge (Mass.), where pragmatism was born as a philosophical movement (Menand
2001).
6. For a full list of Wright’s works and critical studies on his thought, see Parravicini 2011. On
Wright’s life and career, see Madden 1963, 1964; Menand 2001; Norton 1877; Ryan 2000; Sini 1972;
Wiener 1949; Wright 1878.
7. On the close relationship between Darwinism and classical pragmatism, see Fabbrichesi 2011;
Mc Granahan 2017; Menand 2001; Parravicini 2009, 2012; Pearce 2020; Sini 1972; Wiener 1949.
8. “Positivism, to be sure, so far as it pretends to be a philosophy at all is more than the body of
the sciences. It must be a system of the universal methods, hypotheses and principles which are
founded on them, and if not a universal science in an absolute sense, yet must be coextensive
with actual knowledge and exhibit the consilience of the sciences” (Wright to Abbot, February 10,
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1869,  in  LCW: 141).  See Pearce 2015,  and De Groot  2004 on Wright’s  non-canonical  (and not
specifically Comtean) positivism.
9. This is how O. W. Holmes Jr. referred to Wright in a letter (see Wiener 1949: 174). Madden
(1952) wrote an essay entitled Chauncey Wright: Forgotten American Philosopher. Nevertheless, at the
beginning  of  the  new  millennium  interest  in  Wright  was  renewed  by  the  reprint  of  his
Philosophical Discussions (1877, PD), along with his Letters (1878, LCW) and a series of old essays by
various scholars on different aspects of Wright’s thought (Ryan 2000).
10. See Fabbrichesi 2009. See also below, section 5.
11. Darwin explained this point in 1868, II:248-9; 431.
12. Wiener 1945, 1949. See also PD: 136-8. 
13. The Latin term evolutio designates the act of unfolding something, e.g. a roll of parchment.
This term was used by those pre-Darwinian biologists of the 18th century who supported a “pre-
formational” view, according to which the evolutionary process was assimilated to the unfolding
of the immanent potential of an Essence, preformed and not changeable from the beginnings. See
Gould (1977: 34-5).
14. The peculiar logical structure of this kind of postdictive inference that we may call – in the
words of Huxley (1881) – a “retrospective prophecy” (see also Ginzburg 1983) recalls what Peirce
named “retroduction.” We leave the attempt to prove this connection up to future studies, as this
would lead us too far from our current goal. However, if this link were confirmed, the logic of
retroduction  that  supports  pragmatist  philosophy  as  a  guiding  principle  could  somehow  be
acknowledged  as  the  kind  of  inference  that  drives  the  “retrospective  prophecies”  of  the
Darwinian scientists.
15. François Jacob 1977 drew an analogy between the evolutionary process and the activity of the
bricoleur.
16. See also Gould (2002:  ch. XI).  For an in-depth comparison between the modern notion of
exaptation and Wright’s principle of uses, see Parravicini (2012: 169-94).
17. See Gould (2002: ch. XI) on Darwin’s arguments against Mivart’s objections and Parravicini
(2012: ch.3) on Wright’s arguments against Mivart. 
18. See, e.g., D’Errico & Colagè 2018; Fitch 2012; Parravicini & Pievani 2018; Tattersall 2014.
19. As Kupiec & Sonigo (2000:14-5) argue, according to an instructive model “[l]e résultat du
processus préexiste toujours, de manière virtuelle, au processus réel. Le moule définit le résultat
avant qu’il n’apparaisse. Dans la version darwinienne c’est rigoureusement l’inverse: la pâte à
modeler se transforme spontanément et […] le résultat ne préexiste pas.” 
20. Many studies have revealed the great influence that Wright’s conceptions exerted on James.
See Kennedy (1935); Madden (1954; 1963: 128-42; 1964: 108, 130-1); Schneider (1946: 539); Wiener
(1949:  54-5).  R. B. Perry  wrote  that  “It  is  impossible  to  read  the  Evolution  of  self-consciousness
without being constantly reminded of James” (Ryan 2000: 145). On James’ views, see the very
recent Bella 2019.
21. The same example about “force” is found in Peirce’s How to make our ideas clear (1878: CP
5.403).
22. See, e.g.,  Mead ([1932] 2002: 45-6) and Mead (1938: 413). On Mead’s emergentism see also
Baggio 2019.
Pragmatism and Emergentism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
27
ABSTRACTS
The notion of “emergence” has recently received renewed attention in research fields ranging
from biology to  cognitive  sciences  and philosophy of  mind.  Today’s  concept  of  “emergence”
incorporates a long history of philosophical debates and reflections that can be traced back to
James  and  John  Stuart  Mill  and  nineteenth-century  associationist  philosophy.  This  tradition
reached its theoretical maturity in the early twentieth century with so-called classical British
emergentism, which gained the attention of pragmatist philosophers from the beginning. In the
current literature exploring the relationship between Pragmatism and the emergentist tradition,
almost nothing is said about the interesting case of Chauncey Wright (1830-1875), a follower of
J. S. Mill and A. Bain, and a crucial figure for the origins of pragmatist philosophy. After a brief
historical introduction about the history of the notion of “emergence” and its relationship to
classical Pragmatism, the paper aims to examine Wright’s philosophy in relation, on one hand, to
the pragmatist tradition and, on the other hand, to the problem of emergence. In the wake of
Wright’s original interpretation of Darwin’s evolutionary theory, the article focuses on the key
notions  of  “novelty”  and  “new  uses,”  through  which  Wright  developed  an  “emergentist”
philosophy that was well ahead of its time and attracted the interest of Samuel Alexander, one of
the major philosophers of classical British emergentism. In the second part, the paper analyzes
Wright’s  reflections  about  the  origin  of  human self-consciousness  as  a  paradigmatic  case  of
authentic evolutionary novelty. In the final part, the article focuses on the kind of pragmatic
realism sketched out by Wright and summarizes the most important aspects to have emerged
during the scholarly debate on the topic.
AUTHOR
ANDREA PARRAVICINI
Università degli Studi di Milano
andrea.parravicini[at]unimi.it
Pragmatism and Emergentism
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, XI-2 | 2019
28
